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Increasing foreign participation and high concentration levels characterize the recent evolution of 
banking sectors’ market structures in developing countries. We analyze the impact of these 
factors on Latin American bank spreads during the late 1990s. Our results suggest that foreign 
banks were able to charge lower spreads relative to domestic banks. This was more so for de 
novo foreign banks than for those that entered through acquisitions. The overall level of foreign 
bank participation seemed to influence spreads indirectly, primarily through its effect on 
administrative costs. Bank concentration was positively and directly related to both higher 
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I Introduction 
The market structure of the banking industry in many developing countries has recently 
undergone significant changes. In particular, the ongoing and, often, extensive entry of foreign 
banks has been the source of a far-reaching transformation. Between 1994 and 1999, the share of 
assets held by foreign banks (i.e., those banks that are at least 50 percent foreign) increased from 
7.8 percent to 52.3 percent among countries in Eastern Europe (IMF 2000). For countries in 
Latin America, the increase in foreign bank participation over the same period was from 13.1 
percent to 44.8 percent. At the same time, the rise in foreign bank participation often occurred in 
the context of already high and, in some countries, rising levels of bank concentration. Among a 
sample of 33 developing countries, the level of bank assets held by the three largest banks 
averaged 64 percent during 1995-99.
1  
Growing foreign bank presence and high levels of bank concentration in developing 
countries have been the consequence of a number of factors, some of them interrelated. A facet 
of the larger process of financial liberalization and international integration, foreign entry was 
also encouraged by local banking authorities following financial crises, as they sought to 
minimize the costs of recapitalizing domestic financial systems. The high levels of concentration 
have also in part been the consequence of crises, as banks closed, merged or were acquired. In 
some cases, where foreign banks acquired existing domestic banks, foreign bank entry 
contributed to bank concentration. Foreign competition, moreover, induced domestic bank 
consolidation and concentration.  
A question of interest to policymakers and academics alike is the impact of foreign bank 
entry and bank concentration on bank spreads--the difference between the rate charged to 
                                                 
1 Figures obtained from Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2004). 
   3
borrowers and the rate paid by depositors.
2 Spreads are commonly interpreted as a measure of 
the cost of financial intermediation (Saunders and Schumacher 2000; Brock and Rojas-Suarez 
2000). High spreads can hinder the growth of savings and investment and imply that the cost of 
using the financial system may become prohibitive for certain borrowers. Furthermore, the 
impact of high spreads is likely to be more severe for developing countries where, given that 
capital markets are generally small and under-developed, a larger percentage of firms and 
individuals tend to depend on banks to meet their financial needs. 
A number of recent papers investigate the impact of foreign entry on bank spreads and 
other variables (see for example Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga  2000; Barajas, 
Steiner, and Salazar 2000; and Denizer 2000). Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2004), in 
turn, examine the implications of concentration and bank regulation on spreads.
3Yet, few studies 
have considered the parallel trends toward more foreign entry and consolidation in the sector. 
None has examined how different types of foreign bank entry affect spreads.  
Our paper investigates the impact of foreign bank participation and concentration on bank 
spreads in a sample of Latin American countries during the late 1990s. Using bank-level data for 
Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, we examine a number of hypotheses. First, we 
investigate whether foreign banks are able to operate with lower spreads, directly benefiting 
borrowers. We refer to this effect as the “own effect” of foreign bank presence.  
Second, we examine whether the type of foreign bank entry influences how big the “own 
effect” might be. In other words, among the foreign banks we distinguish between those that 
entered or increased their presence in the system by acquiring domestic banks and those that 
                                                 
2 For a review of the potential consequences of foreign bank participation, see Levine (1996). For a discussion of the 
impact of bank concentration on profitability, see Berger (1995).  For a test of whether bank consolidation and 
concentration has worsened competition in developing countries, see Gelos and Roldós (2002). 
3 For a broader discussion of the implications of consolidation, see Gelos and Roldós (2002) for developing 
countries and Berger (1995) for a review of the U.S. evidence.   4
established de novo operations. Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004) suggest that even if all banks 
are equally cost efficient, they may charge different spreads, based on their specialization in 
different market segments. Alternatively, newly established foreign banks may be more 
aggressive in their pricing strategies to gain market share. Though we are not be able to formally 
test whether variations in market segments or in pricing strategies account for differences in 
spreads across banks, to our knowledge, our study is the first to examine whether all forms of 
foreign entry have the same impact on spreads.  
Third, we analyze whether there is a “spillover effect” as a result of foreign bank 
participation. That is, once we control for the origin (domestic or foreign) of individual banks, 
we test whether the overall level of foreign bank participation in the banking system raises or 
lowers spreads across the board, and, in particular, among domestic banks. A priori the spillover 
effect of foreign bank participation is indeterminate. Spreads would be lowered if foreign banks 
competed directly with domestic banks, forcing them to reduce their spreads.
4 Alternatively, 
faced with foreign bank competition, domestic banks may redirect their lending to segments that 
are more opaque, where they have an information advantage and greater market power, allowing 
them to charge higher spreads (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 2004). 
Finally, we study the impact of bank concentration on bank spreads by including several 
measures of system-wide bank concentration in our estimations. At the same time, we control for 
banks’ market share and for cases of bank consolidation. 
We believe this paper contributes to the existing literature not only by testing some 
hypotheses that have been overlooked before, but also by focusing on a region that has been at 
                                                 
4 Domestic banks may lower spreads either because they are driven to become more efficient following bank entry 
(by, for example, imitating some of the practices introduced by foreign banks) or because they are forced to give up 
some of the margins they were able to charge before. In other words, lower spreads could be the result of lower costs 
or lower revenues.   5
the forefront of the recent changes in bank market structure in developing countries and that has 
traditionally been characterized by high spreads. Latin America makes for an interesting case 
study for a number of reasons. First, perhaps after Eastern Europe, Latin America has been the 
region to witness the sharpest increase in foreign bank participation (IMF 2000). Second, despite 
embarking on a process of financial market liberalization during the late 1980s and early 1990s--
which included the elimination of interest rates and direct credit controls--spreads in the region 
remained high even in the mid-1990s.
5 Third, concentration rose or remained high (depending on 
the country) in part because many foreign banks increased their participation by acquiring 
domestic banks. Also, in many of these countries, there has been a trend toward consolidation 
among domestic banks. 
Our empirical analysis yields a number of interesting results. We find that foreign banks 
are able to charge lower spreads and have lower costs than domestic banks. Moreover, those 
foreign banks that acquired domestic institutions have higher spreads than those that established 
de novo operations, suggesting either some market segmentation or differences in pricing 
strategies to gain market share. However, we do not find consistent evidence of a direct spillover 
effect on spreads. Instead, the degree of system-wide foreign bank participation (as measured by 
the share of total loans) appears to influence spreads through its effects on costs. Greater 
participation of foreign banks lowers costs all around. On the other hand, a higher degree of 
concentration in the banking system has a positive and economically significant impact on both 
spreads and costs. 
                                                 
5 Brock and Rojas-Suarez (2000) study spreads in Latin America during 1990-1996 and conclude that they have not 
gone down significantly (perhaps with the exception of Mexico) and in many cases are still three times higher than 
those observed for industrial countries (though less so for Chile). In general, the study finds that high operating or 
administrative costs are particularly significant in explaining the behavior of bank spreads in the region.  
   6
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the structure of 
the banking sector and the behavior of bank spreads in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and 
Peru over the late 1990s. Section III discusses the empirical methodology and data used to study 
the determinants of bank spreads in Latin America. Section IV presents the empirical results and 
section V concludes. 
 
II   Foreign Bank Participation, Concentration, and Spreads in Latin America 
As in many developing economies, countries in Latin America experienced a significant 
increase in foreign bank participation during the late 1990s (see Table 1). In Argentina, foreign 
bank participation increased from 18.9 percent in 1995 to 49.4 percent of outstanding loans in 
2000. In Chile, Mexico, and Peru the share of bank loans held by foreign banks rose from below 
15 percent in 1995 to exceed 40 percent by the end of the decade.
6  Colombia is the only country 
in our sample where foreign banks consistently accounted for one-fourth of the loans during the 
period under consideration.  
Despite the dramatic increase in foreign bank participation, the total number of banks in 
the region dropped in four of the five countries and concentration levels increased or remained 
high (see Table 1). In Argentina and Peru, the number of bank declined by more than 30 percent 
between 1995 and 2000.  The total number of banks in Argentina fell from about 141 in 1995 to 
90 in 2000. While Peru had 29 banks in 1995, this number dropped to 20 by 2000. For Colombia 
and Chile, the number of banks fell by 18 and 11 percent, respectively, during this period. The 
one exception is Mexico, where the number of banks increased from 39 to 40 between 1997 and 
2000. 
                                                 
6 In the case of Mexico, the foreign bank share exceeded 40 percent by 2001.   7
In all five countries, the share of loans held by the top three (five) banks exceeded 30 (40) 
percent for most of this period and the Herfindahl index was above 650. Concentration levels 
rose significantly for Argentina and Chile between 1995 and 2000. In Argentina, the share of 
loans held by the top five largest banks increased from 40.9 percent in 1995 to 49.4 percent in 
2000. Similarly, this share increased from 51.9 percent to 61.5 percent for the case of Chile 
between 1995 and 2000. 
The drop in the number of banks and the high or rising concentration levels can be 
ascribed to several reasons. First, there were many bank closures during this period. Such 
closures typically followed periods of financial distress in the countries, like the Tequila crisis in 
Argentina in 1995, when 32 banks closed, and the 1998-99 period of financial turmoil in 
Colombia, when 4 institutions were liquidated.  
Second, much of the increase in foreign bank participation resulted from purchases of 
domestic banks.  Thus, foreign entry did not typically add to the number of banks. In Argentina, 
sixteen foreign banks acquired domestic financial institutions during the period 1995-2000. The 
Spanish banks BBVA and Santander, the British bank HSBC, and the Canadian Scotia Bank 
were among the most significant entrants in Argentina. During the same period, foreign banks 
acquired five domestic banks in Chile, two in Colombia, and three in Mexico. As in Argentina, 
Santander, BBVA, and Scotia were important players in these countries. Though there were also 
some truly de novo entries, i.e., cases of foreign banks that started their own operations without 
any affiliation with domestic banks, these were not the norm.
7 Six foreign banks set up de novo 
operations in Argentina, while two banks settled in Peru over this period. This explains why the 
                                                 
7 Following the lifting of restrictions on foreign entry, fifteen foreign banks initiated operations in Mexico during 
1995 and 1996. These entrants were small relative to the existing domestic banks, and the main increase in foreign 
bank participation occurred through the acquisition of domestic banks after 1998.   8
total number of foreign banks in these countries did not increase at the same pace as the increase 
in foreign bank participation in the system.  
At the same time, many domestic banks also consolidated with other domestic banks due 
to financial distress or as a strategy to compete with foreign banks, bringing down the total 
number of institutions. Thirty-seven such transactions took place in Argentina, four in Chile, 
three in Colombia, and three in Peru during the late 1990s. 
What has been the impact of foreign bank participation and concentration on bank 
spreads? While a detailed econometric analysis is required to answer this question, it is 
interesting to note some trends in these variables. In Argentina, Colombia, and Peru, spreads 
have dropped during most of the late 1990s (see Table 1). A cursory look at the data for these 
countries suggests that spreads tended to decline in periods when foreign participation increased, 
but concentration levels remained constant. In Chile and Mexico, the increase in foreign 
participation appears to have had little effect on spreads perhaps because both countries had high 
levels of concentration at the start of the period and throughout. Note, however, that by the mid-
1990s spreads in Chile and Mexico were already quite low by regional standards. 
  Foreign and domestic bank spreads appear to move very much in tandem across countries 
in the region. This behavior could signal the influence of macroeconomic factors and/or similar 
cost structures that affect all banks in the system, as well as the possibility that in general or at 
least in certain markets foreign and domestic banks compete with each other for customers. 
However, in Argentina, Colombia, and Peru, throughout most of the sample, and in all countries 
by the end of the period, foreign banks seemed to be able to operate with lower spreads.  
   9
III Empirical  Methodology and Data 
In this section, we turn to an econometric analysis of the impact of concentration and 
foreign bank presence on bank spreads. In particular, we study the effect of market structure 
changes on bank spreads, while controlling for a host of bank characteristics and macroeconomic 
variables, by estimating regressions of the following form: 
 
where i is the bank id, j identifies the country, and t refers to the time period considered. 
Equation (1) is motivated by the dealership model of bank spreads developed by Ho and 
Saunders (1981), extended by Allen (1988), Angbazo (1997) and others, and the firm-theoretical 
framework developed by Zarruck (1989) and Wong (1997).
8 Both models predict that operating 
costs, regulatory costs, credit risks, and the market structure of the banking sector can affect 
spreads.
9 
  In equation (1), the variable Spread is the difference between the implicit average interest 
charged on loans and the implicit average interest paid on deposits.  In other words, the spread is 
                                                 
8 According to the dealership approach, banks are risk-averse dealers trying to balance loan and deposit markets, 
where loan requests and deposit flows are not necessarily synchronized. In this set up, bank spreads are interpreted 
as fees charged by banks for the provision of liquidity under transactions uncertainty. The firm theoretical model of 
banks assumes these operate in a static framework where the demand and supply for loans and deposits clears both 
markets.  
9 A common limitation of the empirical applications of these frameworks is that market structure differences across 
countries have been modeled by including country dummies (see Saunders and Schumacher (2000), that is they have 
been implicitly assumed to be constant over time. 
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calculated by taking the total interest received by banks on loans during one quarter divided by 
the average loans for that period and subtracting from it the total interest paid on deposits 
throughout the quarter divided by average deposits. Liquidity is measured as the ratio of liquid to 
total assets. Liquid assets refer to cash and deposit balances in other banks (including reserve 
requirements at the central bank). High liquidity ratios, either self-imposed for prudential reasons 
or as a result of regulation (e.g., reserve or liquidity requirements), inflict a cost on banks since 
they have to give up holding higher yielding assets. To the extent that banks are able to transfer 
this opportunity cost to borrowers, spreads will rise with liquidity ratios.  
  Administrative Costs refers to the ratio of administrative expenses (including payroll and 
overhead) to average assets. If banks incur high administrative costs in the process of providing 
their services as intermediaries, they are likely to increase the spread they charge their customers. 
NPLs is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. This variable is intended to capture 
credit risk. Faced with higher credit risk, banks are likely to charge higher rates on their loans, as 
equity holders demand risk-adjusted returns. Equity refers to the share of bank equity to total 
assets. Holding large equity ratios either on a voluntary basis or as a result of regulation can be 
costly for banks. We would expect bank spreads to rise with this variable. Market Share is the 
ratio of each banks’ loans to total system loans. To the extent that market shares get translated 
into market power, banks with higher shares of the market may be able to charge higher rates on 
loans. On the other hand, larger banks may be able to reap economies of scale and may pass on 
some of these benefits to their customers in the form of lower spreads. 
  Foreign Bank is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if a bank is foreign at each point in 
time. By introducing this variable, we can test whether the average spread for foreign banks is 
significantly different from the average spread for domestic institutions. That is, this variable   11
allows us to test for the “own effect” of foreign bank presence. Foreign M&A is a dummy 
variable that identifies those transactions where foreign banks increased their size or began 
operations within our sample by acquiring domestic banks. Foreign de novo, on the other hand, 
is a zero/one variable that captures those foreign banks that set up de novo operations in a given 
country. The purpose of including the latter two variables is to determine how the spreads for 
these banks compare with those that have been foreign since the start of the sample and how 
different modes of foreign bank entry and/or strategies to increase participation in local markets 
affect bank spreads.  
  We also control for other types of mergers and acquisitions, namely those involving 
domestic banks or foreign banks, by including the variable Other_M&As, which takes the value 
of 1 for those domestic or foreign banks that acquired an institution of the same type. Both M&A 
variables (i.e, Foreign and Other) plus the dummy identifying foreign de novo entry are 
interacted with Age, the time since entry (measured in years), to allow for the possibility that 
there is an adjustment period until banks can attain their desired level of spreads after they enter 
a new market or purchase/merge with a bank. 
  Foreign bank participation is the share of loans in the hand of foreign banks. This 
variable captures the dynamic impact of changes in the relative importance of foreign banks on 
the overall level of spreads. In other words, this variable is included to test whether there is a 
“spillover effect” arising from the presence of foreign banks in the system. Banking sector 
concentration measures the extent to which loans are concentrated on the hands of few banks 
within a system. In most of the estimations, we include three different measures of concentration, 
namely, the Herfindahl index – defined as the sum of squared loan market shares -  plus the share 
of loans held by the top 3 and top 5 largest banks, respectively. We expect concentration   12
measures to have a positive impact on bank spreads, once we control for differences in cost 
ratios across banks. Furthermore, contrary to the literature on bank concentration and 
profitability, where a positive association between these variables can signal different things, we 
interpret a positive sign on bank concentration as an indication of greater market power and less 
competition in the banking sector.
10  
  Given that the level of bank spreads can be affected by the macroeconomic environment 
in which banks operate, we control for the Inflation rate, the Real output growth, and a measure 
of the money market Short-term Real Interest Rate. Following Smith (2001), we include the 
inflation rate for two reasons. First, given that bank spreads are the difference between two 
nominal rates, if inflation shocks are not passed through to both rates equally fast, then spreads 
should reflect this. Second, Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) have found that inflation can affect the 
flexibility of loan rates and therefore of bank spreads. The real growth of output variable could 
help pick up business cycle effects as those discussed by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). These studies suggest that changes in output can affect lending 
rates, and consequently spreads, because borrowers’ creditworthiness is countercyclical. As 
output growth slows down, creditworthiness deteriorates and, other things equal, this is likely to 
be reflected in higher bank loan rates and, consequently, spreads. Finally, we include a measure 
                                                 
10 An extensive literature exists studying the impact of concentration on bank profitability (see Berger 1995 for a 
review). While the literature unanimously predicts a positive association between concentration and profitability, 
different theories exist explaining what is behind this result. The structure-conduct-performance theory argues that 
bank concentration signals market power and that a positive association between profits and concentration is 
unambiguously bad for the economy. A related theory is the relative market power hypothesis, which claims that 
only firms with large market share and differentiated products can obtain market power and are able to earn profits 
above normal. On the other hand the efficiency-structure hypothesis contends that larger concentration levels and 
market shares could reflect greater efficiency by the largest banks, which in turn are able to lower costs and obtain 
higher profits. While a problem of observational equivalence exists in interpreting the relation between bank 
concentration and profits, this issue should not arise in analyzing bank spreads. Relatively more efficient banks 
should be able to charge lower spreads, as a result of having lower costs. Consequently a positive association 
between bank spreads and concentration should signal greater market power and less competition in the banking 
sector.    13
of the short-term money market real interest rate to control for the marginal cost of funds faced 
by banks.  
We obtained bank-level balance sheet and income statement data from the 
Superintendency of Banks in each of the countries in our sample. For Argentina, Chile, and Peru 
the data covers the period 1995-2000. For Colombia, we obtained data for 1997-2000. For 
Mexico, where a change in accounting standards does not allow us to use data before 1997, the 
sample studied is 1998-2001. The data frequency is quarterly in all cases. The corresponding 
bank authorities also provided detailed accounts on the foreign banks operating in each country 
at each point in time along with information on their mode of entry (e.g., via acquisitions or by 
de novo entry). They also supplied us with the list of mergers and acquisitions among domestic 
banks and between existing foreign banks.  
Data on inflation, output growth, and the real short-term interest rate came from the IMF 
International Financial Statistics database. Table 2 contains a detailed description of the variables 
used in this paper together with means and standard deviations for each of them.
11  
 
IV Empirical  Results   
  Table 3 presents the estimation results for equation (1), analyzing the determinants of 
loan-deposit spreads for private banks in Latin America.
12 In particular, results are reported for 
all private banks and, separately, for domestic and foreign banks, respectively.  Throughout, the 
t-statistics shown were calculated allowing standard errors to be correlated for observations 
                                                 
11 Note that while Table 1 reports annualized spreads, Table 2 presents quarterly spreads, since the regressions are 
conducted with quarterly observations. 
12 Because the spreads charged by public banks may be subject to constraints due to direct subsidies and other 
political considerations, we do not include these banks in our sample. Also, since implicit bank spreads calculated 
from quarterly income and balance sheet data can be quite volatile, we exclude those observations in the top and 
bottom 5 percentile of the distribution of the change in bank spreads. The purpose of doing so is to avoid the 
possibility that outliers drive our results. However, eliminating these observations does not change the results 
described below.    14
corresponding to the same bank within a country (i.e., using clustered standard errors as 
described by Rogers, 1993). 
The estimates reported in Table 3 were obtained pooling all countries in our sample 
(Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru). However, they are not intended to explain 
variations across countries. Instead, because they include country fixed-effects, they explain 
changes in spreads over time within a country. The purpose of pooling observations in this 
context is to increase the power of our estimations.
13 At the same time, pooling assumes that the 
relation between bank spreads and its determinants can be characterized by the same coefficients 
for all countries. Thus, as part of our sensitivity analysis, we report and discuss below results in 
which we do not include all countries in the estimation.  
The determinants of spreads may be categorized into three groups. First, bank-specific 
variables that include operational characteristics (such as liquidity, non-performing loans, and 
administrative costs), the bank’s market share, whether it is foreign or domestic, whether the 
formation of the bank was the result of a merger or acquisition (M&A) or whether the bank was 
a new (de novo) entrant, and the interaction of bank’s age with the foreign and M&A dummies.
14 
Second, system-wide measures of market structure, including the degree of foreign bank 
participation and concentration.
15 And, finally, variables that control for the macroeconomic 
environment are inflation, real growth of production, and the real market interest rate.  
                                                 
13 For example, we are interested in analyzing if and how the mode of foreign bank entry, by merger and acquisition 
or by de novo entry, affects bank spreads. However, there are few such transactions in each country to study this 
question on a country by country basis.  
14 To address the concern of possible reverse causality from spreads to bank’s operational characteristics (such as 
liquid assets, non-performing loans, and market share), we also estimated similar regressions using one-quarter lags 
of these variables as regressors with virtually identical findings. To save space, this results are available upon 
request.  
15 Because bank origin might be correlated with the degree of foreign bank participation (i.e., the larger the number 
of foreign banks, the more likely it is that foreign bank participation will be high) and bank market share might be 
positively associated with the level of system wide concentration, we reestimated the equations after excluding these   15
For the sample including all banks, among the bank-specific variables, bank liquidity and 
administrative costs have a positive and significant impact on bank spreads in all three 
specifications, corresponding to the different measures of concentration. Banks that either decide 
or are required by regulation to hold a high proportion of their assets in the form of liquid assets 
seem to charge higher spreads. This can be interpreted as banks’ response to the fact that in 
holding higher liquidity ratios, banks forego a return on such assets. However, the impact of 
higher liquidity on bank spreads seems to be quantitatively small: a one standard deviation 
increase in liquidity raises spreads by 0.14 standard deviation. On the other hand, administrative 
costs have a larger impact on bank spreads: a one standard deviation change in administrative 
costs results in an almost 0.6 standard deviation change in spreads. As discussed below, 
administrative costs are influenced by macro country characteristics (inflation, growth, and 
domestic interest rates) and subsume their effects in these regressions, as a consequence of which 
the macro variables do not appear to have a direct influence on spreads.  
Foreign banks, on average, charge lower spreads (0.5 percent lower per quarter) than 
their domestic counterparts. For foreign banks that enter through an M&A process, the full effect 
on spreads is the sum of the Foreign Bank dummy (which has a negative sign) and the Foreign 
M&A dummy (which has a positive sign). This sum is negative and statistically different from 
zero, as noted in the F-test reported at the bottom of Table 3. The estimated coefficients indicate 
that spreads for foreign banks that entered the system through acquisitions of domestic banks are 
0.26 percent per quarter lower than those for domestic banks. Since the Foreign de novo dummy 
is also negative, its sum with the Foreign Bank dummy is a large negative, implying that while 
both types of foreign banks charge lower spreads than domestic banks, the de novo foreign banks 
                                                                                                                                                             
bank level variables to confirm the robustness of our findings. Our main findings remain unchanged. These results 
are available upon request.   16
charge much lower spreads (around 2.7 percent per quarter lower than those for domestic banks). 
The interactions between the mode of entry by foreign banks and the time since entry (Age) are 
never significant.
16 
Two factors could explain why the spreads charged by foreign banks that entered the 
market by acquiring domestic banks might differ from those of de novo entrants. First, de novo 
banks, interested in gaining market share, may be more willing to charge lower rates to reach 
their desired size. Second, the two types of foreign banks may be targeting different market 
segments. Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004) suggest that differences in the information available 
to banks influence who they lend to and the spreads they are able to charge. By virtue of being 
newcomers to the sector, de novo banks are likely to possess the least information about 
domestic borrowers and, hence, would have an incentive to focus on the more transparent 
segments of the market (i.e., where information about borrowers is most accessible). At the same 
time, since transparent market segments are likely to be more competitive, de novo banks would 
be required to charge lower spreads relative to those possible in other market segments. In 
contrast, foreign banks acquiring or merging with domestic banks would inherit proprietary 
customer information, allowing them to serve somewhat less transparent firms, in less 
contestable markets, where they might have some market power and the ability to charge higher 
spreads. Since both types of foreign banks charge lower spreads than their domestic competitors, 
it is possible that domestic banks are forced to increase their lending to the least transparent 
borrowers from whom they are able to obtain the highest spreads.
17 
                                                 
16 Excluding these interaction terms does not change our results. 
17 To test these speculations would require specific data on the portfolio of the different banks, which are not 
available at the present time in the detail that is necessary. As a second best alternative, we tried controlling for the 
share of loans to assets and the ratio of non-interest expenses to assets to take into account that some de novo banks 
might be investing in bonds and/or securities rather than lending. However, these variables never proved to be 
significant and in some cases reduced our sample size. Thus, these results are not reported here, but are available 
upon request.   17
Beyond their incentive and ability to charge lower spreads, do foreign banks have a 
“spillover effect” on the overall level of spreads? We test this possibility by investigating if the 
foreign bank participation variable (i.e., the share of loans held by banks that are at least 50 
percent foreign owned) influences spreads. In our basic estimations on Table 3, the coefficient on 
this variable is statistically insignificant. This result could imply either that no spillover effect 
exists (lower spreads charged by foreign banks do not create sufficient pressure on other banks to 
lower their spreads, perhaps, because of market segmentation) or that the spillover effect 
operates mainly in an indirect manner. For example, through the impact of foreign competition 
on administrative costs, as we examine below. It is possible, of course, that because foreign bank 
participation is rising over time, the variable picks up mainly a time trend and does not speak to 
the issue of “spillovers.” We also explore this possibility below.   
Finally, for the sample including all banks, higher bank concentration raises spreads 
significantly. Regardless of the measure of concentration included, spreads rise as a response to 
increases in bank concentration. A one standard deviation increase in concentration results in a 
0.13 to 0.25 standard deviation change in bank spreads.
18 
In the rest of Table 3, we present estimations for the determinants of spreads among 
domestic banks only (columns 4-6) and foreign banks only (columns 7-9). We continue to find 
that liquidity and administrative costs have a positive impact on bank spreads, with 
administrative costs exercising the stronger influence, especially among foreign banks. Within 
the sample of domestic banks, we also find that those with higher market shares are able to 
charge lower spreads. This may point to the presence of economies of scale among large 
domestic banks. Within the group of foreign banks, the evidence for lower spreads charged by 
                                                 
18 In particular, a one standard deviation change in the share of loans held by the top 3 banks (top 5 banks) results in 
a 0.25 (0.13) standard deviation change in bank spreads. At the same time, a one standard deviation change in the 
Herfindahl index leads to a 0.20 standard deviation rise in bank spreads.   18
the new entrants is reaffirmed. Once again, changes in foreign bank participation do not seem to 
directly affect the overall level of spreads for domestic or foreign banks. Finally, as before, a rise 
in bank concentration leads to higher spreads, with the effect being particularly high and 
significant for domestic banks. 
The spread estimations reported in Table 3 make three assumptions. First, by pooling 
observations across countries we are forcing the coefficients in the spread equations (except for 
the constant) to be the same for all countries. Second, we are also assuming that there are no 
structural shifts (over time) in the relation between bank spreads and their determinants. Finally, 
we are ignoring possible common shocks or time trends.  
Because of the short time series at our disposal, we are unable to run separate regressions 
for each country and formally test the pooling assumption.
19 However, we conduct alternative 
estimations to analyze the sensitivity of our results to this assumption In particular, we obtain 
results excluding Mexico and Colombia, the countries with the shortest time series and with the 
lowest levels of foreign bank participation (see Table 4).
20 Reassuringly, the results are virtually 
the same for this smaller sample. Also, to mitigate the concern that our findings are driven by 
Argentina, the country with the longest time series, Table 4 also reports estimations excluding 
this country. Again, results remained largely unchanged. 
To test for structural shifts in the relation between spreads and their determinants over 
time, we try two possibilities (see Table 5). First, we interact administrative costs (the most 
consistently significant variable across all spread specifications) with a dummy that equals one 
for the period 1999 and beyond. Second, to assess whether the impact of administrative costs on 
                                                 
19 Argentina is the exception, given its large number of banks. Results for Argentina yield the same results and 
conclusions as those for the panel. These results are available upon request. 
20 To save space in Tables 4 and 5 we only report estimations including the loan share of the three largest banks as a 
measure of concentration. However, regressions using the top 5 bank share and the Herfindahl index produce 
virtually the same results. These are available upon request.    19
bank spreads changed with the increase in foreign bank presence, we interact administrative 
costs with the foreign bank share. All interaction terms are always insignificant and our main 
results do not change. 
To control for possible time trends, we repeat our spread estimations including quarterly 
time dummies (see Table 6). Most of our results remain unchanged, except that among domestic 
banks, the foreign bank share has a positive impact on spreads. One possible explanation for this 
result is that competition from foreign banks causes domestic banks to redirect their lending to 
more opaque borrowers to whom they can charge higher spreads. However, this finding does not 
imply that the net effect of foreign bank participation on domestic banks is to increase their 
spreads, since as discussed above, the presence of foreign banks can affect spreads indirectly 
through its impact on administrative costs. We turn to this issue next.  
Table 7 presents the determinants of administrative costs (expressed as a ratio of total 
assets) for all banks and separately for domestic and foreign banks.
21 The macro variables are 
now seen to be significant among domestic banks, unlike in the spreads equations.  Inflation is 
negatively signed, suggesting that bank costs do not respond immediately to general inflation. 
Higher interest rates, which are a proxy for the marginal cost of capital, raise administrative 
costs.  
In general, foreign banks appear to operate with lower costs relative to domestic banks. 
However, in the estimations including all banks, different types of foreign bank entry (via M&As 
or through de novo entry) do not seem to have differential effects on costs. On the other hand, in 
the specification for foreign banks, we find that those that entered through merger and 
acquisitions with domestic banks have higher costs than other foreign banks.  
                                                 
21 Again, recognizing the possibility of reverse causation from costs to market share, we reestimated the regressions 
with lagged values of the market share, with results that are the same as those described here. However, these 
estimations are available upon request.   20
Regardless of their origin, the overall level of foreign bank presence seems to exert a 
downward pressure on the administrative costs of all banks. Thus, despite evidence consistent 
with the hypothesis of market segmentation in our spreads results, foreign bank presence 
apparently generates sufficient competitive pressure to induce an all round lowering of costs.  
However, if foreign bank entry is also associated with increased concentration, there may 
be an offsetting effect. Our results indicate that costs, indeed, go up with concentration. Note that 
unlike for spreads, where the influence of concentration was especially large for domestic banks, 
more concentration seems to raise costs all around in similar measure. This result is consistent 
with the notion that in more concentrated systems there is less pressure for banks to lower their 
administrative costs in order to offer more competitive spreads. Since bank concentration was 
also seen to raise spreads, it has a particularly powerful effect on the costs of intermediation. 
As with the spreads estimations, we repeated the regressions dropping Argentina, Mexico 
and Colombia and adding time dummies. The results remain the same. To save space we do not 
report these results here, but they are available upon request. 
 
V Conclusions 
Our results show that foreign participation and concentration influence the spreads 
charged to borrowers--and hence the process of financial intermediation--in a complex manner. 
The overall effect depends on three channels of influence: the spreads charged by foreign banks 
relative to domestic banks, the “spillover” effects from the presence of foreign banks on both 
spreads charged and operating costs, and the concentration in the banking sector that has 
accompanied foreign entry.    21
First, foreign banks charge lower interest margins and potentially foster financial 
intermediation. New establishments (i.e., de novo banks) appear to operate with particularly low 
spreads.  Whether such entry generates welfare gains is unclear since that will depend on 
whether the lower spreads charged are the consequence of a more aggressive pricing strategy or 
because de novo banks choose to lend only to the most transparent segments with high market 
contestability.  
Second, greater foreign presence does not imply a general decline in spreads, but appears 
to influence the intermediation through lowering costs of operation. More widespread foreign 
bank presence is associated with cost reduction throughout the banking system. Possibly, a 
combination of demonstration effects and potential competition, with banks threatening to 
encroach on each others’ customer base, generates the pressures for cost reduction that ultimately 
benefit bank clients. Thus, long-term benefits of foreign entry are likely to come from lower cost 
structures in the banking system. 
Third, greater concentration raises spreads in an economically important manner.  This is 
so especially for domestic banks. At the same time, concentration is also associated with higher 
administrative costs all around. The implication is that some part of the benefits of foreign entry 
may be offset where concentration levels also increase.  As noted in the introduction, the 
consolidation that did occur in the banking sectors of the countries concerned was not necessarily 
related to foreign entry, although the fact that much of the entry was in the form of takeovers, 
rather than new establishments, did not help create more competition. For policymakers, this 
creates a challenge since more competition is desirable for lowering spreads, but could generate 
vulnerability where the “franchise” value of domestic banks is seriously eroded.   22
Finally, while we believe this paper adds to our understanding of the impact of foreign 
participation and concentration on the costs of financial intermediation in developing countries, 
more work in this area is clearly needed. Given the limited number of countries and short sample 
period we study, there is a need to extend the analysis in both these directions. Also, further 
research linking bank-level data with the banks’ customer profiles would help to explain the 
apparent differences in the spreads charged by foreign and domestic banks, something that this 
paper speculates on but cannot answer definitively.    23
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Table 1:Bank market structure and spreads in Latin America 1995-2000 
  
Country Variables  1995 1996 1997 1998  1999 2000
Argentina  Total number of banks  141 122 115 106  96 90
  Number of foreign banks  32 32 35 38  38 40
  Foreign bank share (percent)  18.9 24.2 30.4 40.9  47.4 49.4
  Top 3 banks share (percent)  30.0 29.9 29.5 30.8  32.1 33.9
  Top 5 banks share (percent)  40.9 41.7 40.9 43.8  46.7 49.4
 Herfindahl  index  483.3 489.6 482.6 545.3  605.5 656.7
  Average annualized spreads – all banks  15.2 11.4 10.6 11.9  12.7 12.3
  Average annualized spreads – domestic banks   16.7 12.8 12 13.5  15.2 14.2
  Average annualized spreads – foreign banks  11.3 8.2 7.6 9.4  9.4 10.2
Chile  Total number of banks  31 31 29 29  29 28
  Number of foreign banks  17 17 17 17  18 18
  Top 3 banks share (percent)  36.6 35.7 42.5 42.1  41.5 41.1
  Top 5 banks share (percent)  51.9 52.6 62.5 62.1  61.9 61.5
 Herfindahl  index  788.8 796.3 982.8 973.1  961.2 949.8
  Average annualized spreads – all banks  4.8 4.5 4.6 4.6  4.5 5.1
  Average annualized spreads – domestic banks   4.8 4.5 4.5 4.3  4.5 6
  Average annualized spreads – foreign banks  4.7 4.4 4.6 4.9  4.5 4.6
Colombia  Total number of banks  33 33  28 27
  Number of foreign banks  13 14  12 10
  Top 3 banks share (percent)  29.5 31.5  32.3 29.9
  Top 5 banks share (percent)  44.1 47.4  50.2 47.3
 Herfindahl  index  584.7 644.4  714.4 691.6
  Average annualized spreads – all banks  17 15.9  13.3 11.3
  Average annualized spreads – domestic banks   18.7 17.4  14.7 13
  Average annualized spreads – foreign banks  14.2 13.6  11.6 9.1
Mexico  Total number of banks  39  39 40
  Number of foreign banks  18  18 20
  Top 3 banks share (percent)  50.0  49.2 47.5
  Top 5 banks share (percent)  63.8  62.7 60.8
 Herfindahl  index  1,108.0  1,055.5 1,078.2
  Average annualized spreads – all banks  4.3  8.8 7
  Average annualized spreads – domestic banks   4.2  8.0 7.3
  Average annualized spreads – foreign banks  4.4  9.8 6.7
Peru  Total number of banks  29 27 27 27  24 20
  Number of foreign banks  15 14 14 14  13 11
  Top 3 banks share (percent)  60.6 61.2 58.2 54.2  53.3 55.7
  Top 5 banks share (percent)  74.4 74.8 70.7 67.0  68.2 72.5
 Herfindahl  index  1468.9 1517.3 1356.5 1203.9  1226.8 1316.4
  Average annualized spreads – all banks  15.7 17.7 15.6 12.8  10.5 9.5
  Average annualized spreads – domestic banks   17 16.6 14.5 12.2  10.9 10.5
  Average annualized spreads – foreign banks  13.3 19.4 17 13.6  9.9 8.4  27
     Table 2: Definition of variables used and data descriptive statistics 




Spread Interest  income received on loans (over 
total loans) minus interest expenses paid on 




Liquid assets  
(over total assets) 
Cash and deposits with other banks 




Non-performing loans  
(over total loans) 
Loans considered to be non-performing by 






(over total assets) 





Foreign bank  Dummy equal to 1 when bank is at least 










(over total assets) 
Bank capital plus reserves  Bank 
superintendencies 
0.145 0.116
Foreign M&A  Dummy equal to 1 for cases when a  




Foreign M&A×Age  Interaction of Foreign M&A with time (in 
fraction of years) since acquisition of a 




Foreign de novo  Dummy equal to 1 for foreign banks that 




 0.002  0.044
Foreign de novo×Age  Interaction of Foreign de novo with time 




Other M&A  Dummy equal to 1 for domestic banks that 
acquired other domestic banks, or for 





Other M&A×Age  Interaction of Other M&A with time (in 






Share of loans held by foreign banks (those 














Herfindahl index  Sum of squared bank market shares  Bank 
superintendencies 
794.405 325.403
Inflation  Rate of growth of the consumer price index  IMF International 
Financial Statistics 
0.011 0.015





Real interest rate  Money market rate – inflation  IMF International 
Financial Statistics 
13.189 8.222
The spreads reported here are quarterly spreads as opposed to those shown in Table 1, which are annualized spreads.   
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Table 3: Panel estimations for bank spreads including all countries 
Variables  All Banks  Domestic Banks  Foreign Banks 
  (3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) (3.6) (3.7) (3.8) (3.9) 
Liquid assets   0.028  0.029  0.028 0.053 0.054 0.052 0.02  0.02  0.02 
  (3.75)*** (3.86)*** (3.68)*** (4.77)*** (4.85)*** (4.72)*** (2.41)**  (2.50)**  (2.35)** 
Non-performing loans  -0.001  -0.00113  -0.00095 0.000331 0.000179 0.000435 -0.0009  -0.0010  -0.0009 
  (0.25) (0.29) (0.24) (0.08) (0.04) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 
Administrative costs  0.653 0.656 0.652 0.569 0.573 0.568 0.74  0.74  0.74 
  (7.88)*** (7.94)*** (7.87)*** (7.73)*** (7.79)*** (7.71)*** (5.82)*** (5.85)*** (5.83)*** 
Foreign  bank    -0.005  -0.005  -0.005        
  (3.92)***  (3.93)***  (3.93)***        
Bank market share  -0.014  -0.014  -0.014 -0.023 -0.024 -0.024 0.05  0.05  0.05 
  (1.38) (1.37) (1.41) (2.00)**  (2.01)** (2.02)** (1.86)*  (1.85)*  (1.85)* 
Equity  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.01  0.01  0.01 
  (1.59) (1.61) (1.60) (1.35) (1.37) (1.35) (0.85) (0.87) (0.86) 
Foreign M&A   0.002379  0.002377  0.002439     -0.00024  -0.00023  -0.00021 
  (2.54)**  (2.55)**  (2.61)***     (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.14) 
Foreign M&A x Age  0.000209  0.000228  0.000159     0.00  0.00  0.00 
  (0.22)  (0.24)  (0.17)     (1.35)  (1.39)  (1.33) 
Foreign de novo  -0.022  -0.022  -0.022     -0.02  -0.02  -0.02 
  (2.08)**  (2.08)**  (2.07)**     (2.05)**  (2.06)**  (2.05)** 
Foreign de novo x Age  0.007  0.008  0.007     0.01  0.01  0.01 
  (1.06)  (1.08)  (1.06)     (1.22)  (1.25)  (1.22) 
Other M&A   0.000195  0.000152  0.000207  0.000599 0.000579 0.000616            
  (0.25) (0.19) (0.26) (0.82) (0.79) (0.84)            
Other M&A x Age  0.000016  0.000048  0.000001  -0.00025 -0.00026 -0.00027            
  (0.03) (0.08) 0.00    (0.37) (0.38) (0.40)            
Foreign share  0.002  0.002  0.001  0.005 0.003 0.003 0.00  0.00  0.00 
  (0.71) (0.46) (0.22) (1.12) (0.56) (0.64) (1.02) (0.67) (1.07) 
Top 3 bank share  0.038        0.05        0.02       
 (3.03)***        (3.26)***        (1.16)       
Top 5 bank share     0.018        0.032        0.002    
    (1.83)*        (2.76)***        (0.11)    
Herfindahl index        0.000011        0.000015        0.00 
       (2.82)***        (3.17)***        (0.97) 
Inflation -0.002  0.005  -0.005  -0.023 -0.017 -0.027 0.01  0.02  0.01 
  (0.07) (0.14) (0.13) (0.57) (0.41) (0.67) (0.21) (0.33) (0.20) 
Real growth of production  0.002  0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.00  0.00  0.00 
  (0.78) (0.67) (0.96) (0.98) (0.87) (1.14) (0.26) (0.30) (0.18) 
Real market interest rate  0.000014  -0.000004  0.00003  0.000068 0.000056 0.000089 -0.000034 -0.000055 -0.000027 
  (0.23) (0.06) (0.48) (1.20) (0.96) (1.52) (0.26) (0.42) (0.2) 
Argentina  0.007 0.002 0.007 0.014 0.01  0.013 0.00  0.00  0.00 
  (1.78)*  (0.54) (1.59) (3.10)***  (2.45)** (3.01)***  (0.35)  (0.56)  (0.21) 
Chile  0.000009 -0.00442 -0.00157 0.003479 -0.00104 0.001457 0.00  0.00  0.00 
  0.00    (1.91)*  (0.63) (1.10) (0.40) (0.54) (0.16) (1.18) (0.46) 
Colombia  0.02  0.015 0.018 0.028 0.023 0.026 0.01  0.01  0.01 
  (4.68)*** (3.95)*** (4.55)*** (5.79)*** (5.60)*** (5.78)*** (1.84)*  (1.25)  (1.73)* 
Mexico  -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.009 -0.01 -0.009  -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
  (4.47)*** (4.92)*** (4.75)*** (3.29)*** (3.76)*** (3.58)*** (2.94)*** (3.19)*** (3.10)*** 
Constant  -0.00651 0.002967 0.000417 -0.0198  -0.01382 -0.01089 -0.0004  0.01  0.004 
  (0.85) (0.39) (0.07) (2.21)**  (1.59) (1.60) (0.03) (0.95) (0.48) 
Observations  2618 2618 2618 1539 1539 1539 1079.00  1079.00  1079.00 
R-squared  0.52   0.52   0.52   0.53   0.53   0.53   0.48   0.48   0.48  
F test, 
Foreign + Foreign M&A=0  5.39  5.41  5.19                
p-value  0.02    0.02    0.02          
Estimations include Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Robust t-statistics (calculated allowing for clustered standard 
errors by bank) are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.         
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Table 4: Panel estimations for bank spreads excluding some countries 
Variables  Excluding Mexico and Colombia  Excluding Argentina 
 All  banks 
Domestic 
banks  Foreign banks All banks 
Domestic 
banks  Foreign banks
Liquid assets   0.031  0.0603 0.0056 0.021  0.042  0.018 
  (2.73)*** (4.89)*** (0.38)  (2.67)***  (2.66)**  (2.03)** 
Non-performing loans  -0.0002  0.0012 0.0013 -0.011  0.005  -0.037 
  (0.04) (0.28) (0.10) (0.59)  (0.31)  (1.75)* 
Administrative costs  0.611 0.5251  0.713 0.815  0.922  0.854 
  (5.71)*** (7.28)*** (3.67)*** (5.81)***  (4.10)***  (5.53)*** 
Foreign bank   -0.0047        -0.004       
 (3.26)***        (2.68)***       
Bank market share  -0.027  -0.034 0.0209 -0.005  -0.014  0.065 
  (2.65)*** (2.81)*** (0.85)  (0.45)  (1.10)  (2.22)** 
Equity 0.009  0.0245  0.0012 0.007  0.004  0.007 
  (1.35) (1.58) (0.21) (0.91)  (0.21)  (0.97) 
Foreign M&A   0.0023    0.0004  0.002     -0.002 
 (2.60)***     (0.32)  (1.99)**     (1.15) 
Foreign M&A x Age  0.0001    0.0012  -0.00042     0.001 
 (0.09)     (1.02)  (0.55)     (0.67) 
Foreign de novo  -0.0223    -0.0184      
 (2.15)**     (2.28)**      
Foreign de novo x Age  0.0073    0.0069      
 (1.05)     (1.24)      
Other M&A   0.0006  0.001    -0.003  -0.001   
  (0.76) (1.46)     (2.65)***  (0.85)   
Other M&A x Age  -0.0001  -0.0004    0.001  0.001   
  (0.19) (0.65)     (0.58)  (0.59)   
Foreign  share  0.0046 0.0087 -0.0034 -0.006  -0.007  -0.005 
 (1.33)  (1.71)*  (0.88)  (1.52)  (1.15)  (1.23) 
Top 3 bank share  0.0565  0.0648  0.0497  0.027  0.031  0.015 
  (4.16)*** (3.83)*** (2.39)**  (2.25)**  (2.26)**  (0.82) 
Inflation  0.1036 0.0572 0.1425 -0.02  -0.03  -0.003 
 (3.52)***  (1.45)  (3.72)***  (0.52)  (0.71)  (0.04) 
Real growth of production  0.000469 0.000805 -0.00125 0.002  0.003  -0.00009 
  (0.18) (0.21) (0.43) (0.65)  (0.82)  (0.02) 
Real market interest rate  0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 -0.00011  -0.0001  -0.0001 
 (1.93)*  (2.23)**  (1.12)  (1.45)  (1.57)  (0.79) 
Argentina  0.0152 0.0206 0.0113     
  (3.12)*** (3.93)*** (1.73)*      
Chile  0.0039 0.0075 0.0038 -0.002  0.002  -0.003 
 (1.30)  (2.15)**  (0.81)  (0.49)  (0.60)  (0.53) 
Colombia     0.02  0.027  0.012 
     (4.42)***  (5.37)***  (1.74)* 
Mexico     -0.014  -0.009  -0.018 
     (4.87)***  (3.65)***  (3.28)*** 
Constant -0.0211  -0.0332  -0.0173 0.003  -0.006  0.006 
 (2.54)**  (3.23)***  (1.42)  (0.42)  (0.71)  (0.48) 
Observations  2188 1303 885  1342  695  647 
R-squared  0.57   0.55   0.58   0.56   0.64   0.53  
The estimations excluding Colombia and Mexico include: Argentina, Chile, and Peru. Those excluding Argentina, include: Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. Robust t-statistics (calculated allowing for clustered standard errors by bank) are in parentheses. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.          30
Table 5: Panel estimations for bank spreads allowing for structural shifts 
Variables 
Interacting administrative costs 
With a dummy post 1999 
Interacting administrative costs  
with foreign bank share 
  All banks  Domestic banksForeign banks  All banks  Domestic banksForeign banks 
Liquid assets   0.0281  0.0522 0.0187 0.028  0.0514 0.0198 
  (3.74)*** (4.70)*** (2.32)**  (3.79)*** (4.62)*** (2.55)** 
Non-performing loans  -0.0009  0.0005 -0.0002  -0.001 0.0004 0.0007 
  (0.23) (0.12) (0.02) (0.25) (0.11) (0.06) 
Administrative costs  0.6418 0.5485 0.7748 0.6502 0.4609 0.8745 
  (6.24)*** (7.35)*** (3.98)*** (4.60)*** (3.98)*** (3.56)*** 
Administrative costs x Dummy 1999-2000 0.0319  0.1051  -0.0783       
  (0.39) (1.66)*  (0.46)      
Administrative costs x Foreign bank  share     0.0099  0.4513  -0.5312 
     (0.03)  (1.37)  (0.87) 
Foreign bank  -0.0052        -0.0051       
 (3.91)***        (3.95)***       
Bank market share  -0.0141  -0.0235 0.0469  -0.014  -0.0234 0.0451 
 (1.39)  (1.99)**  (1.79)*  (1.38)  (1.98)**  (1.69)* 
Equity 0.0095  0.019  0.0043 0.0095 0.0194 0.0037 
  (1.59) (1.36) (0.76) (1.58) (1.38) (0.65) 
Foreign M&A   0.0025     -0.0003  0.0024     -0.0003 
 (2.52)**     (0.22)  (2.50)**     (0.20) 
Foreign M&A x Age  0.0001     0.0018  0.0002     0.0018 
  (0.11)     (1.50) (0.22)     (1.52) 
Foreign de novo  -0.0215     -0.0195  -0.0217     -0.0193 
  (2.07)**     (2.06)** (2.08)**     (2.17)** 
Foreign de novo x Age  0.0073     0.0083  0.0075     0.0078 
  (1.05)     (1.26) (1.07)     (1.23) 
Other M&A   0.0002  0.0007     0.0002  0.0006    
  (0.28) (0.90)     (0.25) (0.86)    
Other M&A x Age  -0.000007  -0.00029     0.000015  -0.00029    
  (0.01) (0.42)     (0.03) (0.42)    
Foreign share  0.0009  -0.000027  -0.001 -0.0128  -0.009 -0.0159 
  (0.18) (0.00) (0.15) (4.45)***  (3.35)***  (2.97)*** 
Top 3 bank share  0.0391  0.0516  0.018  0.0382  0.0513  0.0175 
  (3.06)*** (3.37)*** (0.87)  (3.01)*** (3.36)*** (0.90) 
Inflation -0.0012  -0.0213  0.0053 -0.0024  -0.0267  0.0046 
  (0.03) (0.52) (0.09) (0.07) (0.66) (0.08) 
Real growth of production  0.0017  0.0019  0.0002  0.0023  0.0028  -0.0006 
  (0.52) (0.46) -0.04  (0.77) (0.72) (0.16) 
Real market interest rate  0.000013 0.000064 -0.00003 0.000014 0.000068 -0.000029 
  (0.22) (1.13) -0.24  (0.23) (1.19) (0.22) 
Argentina  0.0078 0.0151 0.0009 0.0021 -0.003 0.0032 
  (1.70)*  (3.26)***  (0.11) (0.39) (0.44) (0.42) 
Chile  0.0002 0.0038 -0.0012  0.0074 0.0143 0.0013 
  (0.06) (1.21) (0.24) (1.75)*  (3.15)***  (0.19) 
Colombia  0.0207 0.0292 0.0118 0  0.0035 -0.0011 
  (4.60)***  (5.91)***  (1.61) 0.00    (1.12) (0.23) 
Mexico -0.013  -0.0095  -0.0151 0.0204  0.0287  0.012 
  (4.75)*** (3.48)*** (2.96)*** (4.65)*** (5.92)*** (1.70)* 
Constant -0.0067  -0.0195  0.0011 -0.0065  -0.0183  0.0002 
  (0.87) (2.20)**  (0.09) (0.85) (2.10)**  (0.02) 
Observations  2618 1539 1079 2618 1539 1079 
R-squared  0.52   0.53   0.48   0.52   0.53   0.49  
These estimations include all countries: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. Robust t-statistics (calculated allowing for 
clustered standard errors by bank) are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   
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Table 6: Panel estimations for bank spreads including quarterly time dummies (not shown)  
Variables  All banks  Domestic banks  Foreign banks 
  (6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4) (6.5) (6.6) (6.7) (6.8) (6.9) 
Liquid assets   0.0272  0.0275  0.027  0.0525 0.0531 0.0523 0.0181 0.0185 0.0181 
    (3.59)*** (3.64)*** (3.56)*** (4.65)*** (4.69)*** (4.63)*** (2.12)**  (2.18)**  (2.10)** 
Non-performing  loans  -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0004  0.0012 0.0012 0.0013 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0009 
    (0.12) (0.13) (0.09) (0.30) (0.29) (0.33) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) 
Administrative costs  0.6424  0.6446  0.6424 0.5498 0.5506 0.5488 0.7338 0.7372 0.7347 
    (7.28)*** (7.29)*** (7.27)*** (7.19)*** (7.20)*** (7.18)*** (5.64)*** (5.65)*** (5.64)*** 
Foreign bank   -0.0051  -0.0051  -0.0051                   
   (3.90)***  (3.91)***  (3.90)***                   
Bank market share  -0.0141  -0.0141  -0.0143 -0.0239 -0.0241 -0.0242 0.0467  0.0468  0.0467 
    (1.40) (1.39) (1.42) (1.99)**  (2.00)** (2.01)** (1.82)*  (1.82)*  (1.82)* 
Equity  0.0095 0.0096 0.0095 0.0185 0.0186 0.0185 0.0049 0.005  0.005 
    (1.57) (1.59) (1.58) (1.29) (1.30) (1.29) (0.90) (0.92) (0.91) 
Foreign  M&A    0.0023 0.0023 0.0024          -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001 
   (2.50)**  (2.50)**  (2.57)**           (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.05) 
Foreign M&A x Age  0.0002  0.0003  0.0002           0.0015  0.0016  0.0015 
    (0.26) (0.34) (0.21)             (1.31) (1.39) (1.30) 
Foreign de novo  -0.0211  -0.0214  -0.0213           -0.0185  -0.0189  -0.0187 
   (2.04)**  (2.05)**  (2.06)**           (1.92)*  (1.94)*  (1.93)* 
Foreign de novo x Age  0.0071  0.0075  0.0072           0.0075  0.0079  0.0076 
    (1.00) (1.05) (1.01)             (1.16) (1.22) (1.18) 
Other M&A   0.0004  0.0003  0.0004  0.0007 0.0007 0.0008            
    (0.45) (0.41) (0.47) (1.02) (0.98) (1.05)            
Other M&A x Age  -0.00002  0.000018  -0.000051  -0.000251 -0.000227 -0.000293            
    (0.04) (0.03) (0.09) (0.36) (0.33) (0.42)            
Foreign  share  0.0099 0.0109 0.0077 0.0201 0.0204 0.0166 -0.0071  -0.0057  -0.0076 
    (1.51) (1.70)*  (1.23) (2.64)***  (2.72)***  (2.30)**  (0.66) (0.55) (0.74) 
Top 3 bank share  0.0386        0.0489        0.0216       
   (3.18)***        (3.46)***        (1.03)       
Top  5  bank share     0.0198        0.0312        0.0034    
      (2.09)**        (3.03)***        (0.20)    
Herfindahl index        0.000011        0.000015        0.000005 
         (2.99)***        (3.49)***        (0.78) 
Inflation  -0.0048 0.0022  -0.0078 -0.0489 -0.0425 -0.054  0.0474  0.0538  0.0475 
    (0.12) (0.05) (0.19) (1.04) (0.90) (1.14) (0.67) (0.76) (0.68) 
Real growth of production  -0.0056  -0.0057  -0.0046 -0.0057 -0.0058 -0.0046 -0.0037 -0.0039 -0.0033 
    (1.71)* (1.70)* (1.37)  (1.34)  (1.33) (1.06) (0.71) (0.74) (0.61) 
Real market interest rate  0.000003  -0.00002 0.000019 -0.000003  -0.000019  0.000023 0.000014 -0.000012  0.000016 
    (0.04) (0.28) (0.27) (0.04) (0.26) (0.30) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) 
Argentina  0.0066 0.0015 0.006  0.0112 0.0067 0.0111 0.0037 -0.0014  0.0024 
    (1.70)*  (0.41) (1.55) (2.60)**  (1.81)*  (2.65)***  (0.57) (0.23) (0.36) 
Chile  -0.0004 -0.0048 -0.002  0.002  -0.0027 0.0004  -0.0005 -0.0039 -0.0018 
    (0.15) (2.17)**  (0.80) (0.67) (1.08) (0.14) (0.09) (1.01) (0.42) 
Colombia  0.0199 0.0146 0.0177 0.0288 0.0236 0.0265 0.0107 0.0058 0.0087 
    (4.53)*** (3.70)*** (4.44)*** (6.06)*** (5.69)*** (6.27)*** (1.41)  (0.86)  (1.25) 
Mexico  -0.0108 -0.012  -0.0111 -0.0047 -0.0057 -0.005  -0.0172 -0.0186 -0.0177 
    (3.10)*** (3.40)*** (3.18)*** (1.52)  (1.88)* (1.64)  (2.59)**  (2.76)***  (2.65)*** 
Constant  -0.0091 -0.0012 -0.0028 -0.0265 -0.0207 -0.0191 0.0044  0.0142  0.0094 
    (0.88) (0.12) (0.30) (2.51)**  (2.03)** (2.09)** (0.24)  (0.75)  (0.58) 
Observations  2618 2618 2618 1539 1539 1539 1079 1079 1079 
R-squared  0.53   0.53   0.53   0.54  0.54   0.54   0.49   0.49   0.49   
These estimations include all countries: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. Quarterly time dummies are included in all 
regressions, but not shown to save space. Robust t-statistics (calculated allowing for clustered standard errors by bank) are in 
parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.         
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Table 7: Panel estimations for administrative costs including all countries 
Variables  All Banks  Domestic Banks  Foreign Banks  
  (7.1) (7.2) (7.3) (7.4) (7.5) (7.6) (7.7) (7.8) (7.9) 
Foreign  bank  -0.0029  -0.0029  -0.0029        
  (2.57)**  (2.57)**  (2.57)**        
Bank market share  -0.0546  -0.0548  -0.0549  -0.0321 -0.0322 -0.0323 -0.085  -0.0853 -0.0856 
  (4.57)*** (4.58)*** (4.58)*** (3.12)*** (3.13)*** (3.14)*** (2.76)*** (2.75)*** (2.77)*** 
Foreign M&A   0.0017  0.0017  0.0018           0.003  0.003  0.0031 
 (1.52)  (1.50)  (1.56)           (2.31)**  (2.29)**  (2.34)** 
Foreign M&A x Age  0.000397  0.000353  0.000316     0.000027  -0.000046  -0.000029 
  (0.16)  (0.14)  (0.13)     (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
Foreign de novo  0.0116  0.0115  0.0115           0.0133  0.0132  0.0132 
 (0.70)  (0.70)  (0.70)           (0.81)  (0.80)  (0.80) 
Foreign de novo x Age  0.0035  0.0035  0.0035           0.003  0.003  0.003 
 (0.39)  (0.39)  (0.39)           (0.33)  (0.33)  (0.34) 
Other M&A   0.0015  0.0015  0.0015  0.0011  0.001  0.0011          
  (2.83)***  (2.79)***  (2.87)***  (2.06)** (2.03)** (2.12)**            
Other M&A x Age  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007            
  (2.24)**  (2.24)**  (2.28)**  (1.41) (1.40) (1.48)            
Foreign  share  -0.0165 -0.0183 -0.0185 -0.0209 -0.0226 -0.0233 -0.009  -0.0113 -0.0104 
  (4.97)*** (5.51)*** (5.67)*** (4.45)*** (4.80)*** (5.01)*** (2.02)**  (2.46)**  (2.41)** 
Top 3 bank share  0.0448        0.0411        0.0503       
 (5.75)***        (4.10)***        (4.08)***       
Top 5 bank share     0.0278        0.0249        0.0338    
    (4.79)***        (3.18)***        (3.81)***    
Herfindahl  index   0.000014    0.000014    0.000013 
       (5.72)***        (4.56)***        (3.34)*** 
Inflation  -0.026  -0.0185 -0.0285 -0.0698 -0.0623 -0.0748 0.0314  0.0387  0.0323 
 (1.57)  (1.12)  (1.69)*  (3.47)***  (3.18)*** (3.59)*** (1.08)  (1.32)  (1.09) 
Real growth of production  -0.0106  -0.0109  -0.0098 -0.0173 -0.0178 -0.0164 -0.0029 -0.0031 -0.0023 
  (3.99)*** (4.05)*** (3.77)*** (4.46)*** (4.48)*** (4.29)*** (0.81)  (0.85)  (0.64) 
Real market interest rate  0.000113  0.0001  0.000135 0.000167 0.000154 0.000193 0.000027 0.000013 0.000042 
  (3.16)*** (2.85)*** (3.59)*** (3.55)*** (3.37)*** (3.97)*** (0.54)  (0.27)  (0.79) 
Argentina  0.015 0.011 0.015 0.019  0.0151 0.0204 0.0099 0.0061 0.0077 
  (4.78)*** (3.79)*** (4.87)*** (6.29)*** (5.42)*** (6.83)*** (1.75)*  (1.17)  (1.42) 
Chile  -0.0075 -0.0119 -0.0089 -0.0056 -0.0097 -0.0061 -0.0105 -0.0151 -0.0132 
  (3.09)*** (5.62)*** (3.95)*** (2.76)*** (6.22)*** (3.41)*** (2.31)**  (3.66)*** (3.12)*** 
Colombia 0.003635  -0.00146  0.001709  0.004937 0.000041 0.004434 0.002926 -0.00211 -0.00107 
  (1.37) (0.64) (0.72) (1.88)*  (0.02) (1.94)*  (0.62) (0.51) (0.26) 
Mexico  0.0026  0.001238 0.002388 -0.000028  -0.00139 0.000251 0.004398 0.003138 0.003509 
  (0.85) (0.40) (0.82) (0.01) (0.74) (0.13) (0.78) (0.55) (0.66) 
Constant  -0.0025  0.0039 0.0043 -0.0033  0.0031 0.0008 -0.006 -0.0005  0.005 
  (0.49) (0.81) (1.03) (0.56) (0.55) (0.18) (0.70) (0.06) (0.70) 
Observations  2982 2982 2982 1752 1752 1752 1230 1230 1230 
R-squared  0.36   0.36   0.37   0.40   0.40   0.40   0.36   0.36   0.36  
F test, 
Foreign + Foreign M&A=0  0.86  0.85  0.74                   
p-value  0.36   0.36   0.39                    
These estimations include observations for Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. Robust t-statistics (calculated allowing for 
clustered standard errors by bank) in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.     
  